The paper analyzes the ways for measuring competitiveness as well as the Global Competitiveness Index which, pursuant to the methodology of the World Economic Forum, ranks countries' competitiveness within global frameworks. The analysis begins with a hypothesis that the macroeconomic performances of national economies are positively correlated with their global competitiveness index, which has been shown on the examples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia. The other hypothesis is that the bad macroeconomic performances of the Serbian economy and its bad ranking according to the Global Competitiveness Index are the result of the systemic limitations in the Serbian economy. The analysis presented in the paper shows that systemic limitations such as the concept of transition (privatization) and its realization, the concept of macroeconomic stabilization, the concept of institutional reforms and the concept of restructuring economy are the main originators of the non-competitiveness of Serbia's economy.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of the analysis is the competitiveness of Serbia's economy, which is being compared to the competitiveness of Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia. The aim of the paper is to show that the systemic limitations in Serbia's economy were more emphasized than those of the aforementioned countries in transition, which is refl ected in the balance of trade and the global competitiveness index of the observed countries. The paper starts from the following hypotheses: the fi rst hypothesis is that the macroeconomic performance of Serbia and of the observed countries is positively correlated with their global competitiveness index; the second hypothesis is that the systemic limitations in Serbia's economy (the concept of transition, the concept of macroeconomic stabilization, the concept of institutional reforms and the restructuring of public companies) are the major cause for the noncompetitiveness of Serbia's economy.
In order to confi rm the hypotheses, we carried out a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic performances and the global competitiveness index of Serbia and the observed countries and Pearson's correlation coeffi cient between the global competitiveness index and the GDP p/c of the analyzed countries.
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
Economists have diff erent ways of understanding and defi ning national competitiveness, therefore the concepts of national, international and global competitiveness overlap in many aspects. In addition to various formal diff erences in defi ning national, international and global competition, most defi nitions contain many common elements. Thus, all the defi nitions of competitiveness highlight a country's ability to achieve the high sustainable economic growth rates of the GDP p/s and its ability to produce goods and services that meet the world market test. In accordance with a variety of competitiveness concepts, diff erent approaches for measuring competitiveness have been developed. McFetridge (1995) concluded that, generally, two options in measuring competitiveness can be distinguished. The fi rst is based on determining income per capita or productivity growth, and the other on determining the performance of international trade.
The contemporary concept of the competitiveness of an economy means that companies struggle for markets and resources and use business strategies to improve their performances and profi tability at the national and international level. It connects the micro-and macroeconomic factors of competitiveness (Nurbel, 2007) or price competitiveness (which is a microeconomic concept) with the balance of trade (which is a macroeconomic concept). The microeconomic concept of price competitiveness is based on the costs and the business strategy of a fi rm and aff ects the balance of trade through export and import prices. On the other hand, the macroeconomic factors such as exchange rates (which a fi rm cannot have an infl uence on), aff ect a fi rm's price competitiveness. The microeconomic decisions of a fi rm and macroeconomic factors aff ect the price competitiveness of export and import, and price competitiveness is the force driving trade fl ows and aff ects the balance of trade.
Price competitiveness is not the only determinant of the balance of trade. The balance of trade refl ects the collective actions of individual consumers, fi rms and the government, and is the diff erence between domestic aggregate production and aggregate consumption. When a country spends more than it produces, it will have a defi cit even if workers (in terms of pay) and producers (in terms of product prices) are competitive in the world market.
Prices are the measure of competitiveness at a given moment. In the long-term, competitiveness is based on the quality of the resources that fi rms utilize in the production of goods and services, as well as on the decisions of households, fi rms and the government on how to spend and save. In addition, there are many factors infl uencing the long-term capacity of a country to produce and compete on the world market: the effi ciency with which fi nancial markets transform savings into investments, the ability and speed of accepting technological innovations, the ability of workers to acquire the skills demanded by the labor market, the quality of the business decisions made by the management and the government's policy-related decisions and other factors (Dani, 2007) .
Today, a% ention is focused on the importance of the competitive advantages of nations and their impact on economic growth and living standards (Porter, 2001) . The basic idea is that if a country eff ectively identifi es the true source of its competitiveness, it will face fewer problems during its economic development. In this context, competitiveness is linked to productivity. Productivity growth is the key factor of the growth of income per capita; the key factor of productivity growth is innovation; the key factor of innovation is the functioning of the diamond of the national advantage (cluster) as an innovative system. According to Porter (1990) , the countries with strong clusters will have higher rates of productivity growth and an unquestionable advantage compared to the countries with weak clusters. In this context, it is important to understand the determinants of productivity and the rate of productivity growth in specifi c industries and the industry's segments (Porter, 2008) .
According to Porter (1990) the international competitiveness is determined by the following phenomena: 1) the macroeconomic phenomena such as exchange rates, interest rates, a budget defi cit, 2) the cheap and abundant labor force, 3) the availability of natural resources, 4) various management practices, 5) low unit labor costs, 6) a positive balance of trade, and 7) high and constantly increasing productivity.
Paul Krugman (1994) criticized the concept of national competitiveness, pointing out that domestic factors are the ones that dominantly infl uence the level of the GDP p/s and welfare, not the national competitiveness confi rmed in the global market. He emphasizes that, in defi ning national competitiveness, the importance of the structural factors (productivity, innovation, and skills) is highlighted and the essence of the competitive advantage is ignored, and those are comparative advantages. When economies trade, they do not compete in a confrontational way (as fi rms do); instead, they operate so that each side has some benefi ts (a plus-sum game). Countries specialize in goods that are produced cheaply, i.e., in those whose opportunity costs are lower (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2003) .
Although analysts have pointed out the shortcomings and defi ciencies in its dra' ing (Smith, 2010) , today, the widely accepted indicator of the global competitiveness of countries is the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), established according to the methodology of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Researchers of the WEF, with the help of the GCI concept, conducted a synthesis of the micro-and macroeconomic indicators of competitiveness, taking into account and harmonizing the recommendations of the theory of the growth and development of contemporary institutional economics and applied business economics. In this way, they theoretically and practically linked the strategic aspects of business competitiveness at the level of an individual company with the total environment at the level of the sectors, industries and the whole economy (Maksimović, 2010a) . The analysis showed (Schuller & Lidbom, 2009 ) that countries highly ranked according to the GCI are highly ranked according to income per capita and the standard of living. Pearson's coeffi cient of correlation between the rank of the GCI and the GDP per capita is very high and positive. The value of sub-indicators, for which there are no internationally comparable databases, is determined only on the basis of the survey, ranking from 1 to 7 (the business conditions, the market climate, the freedom of the press, the effi ciency of the legal framework, the political situation, the fi nancial market sophistication, the eff ectiveness of the anti-monopoly policy).
For calculating the competitiveness, sub-indicators such as infl ation, the budget defi cit, thetax level, the number of telephone lines, and the number of procedures to start a business, the internationally comparable databases of the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization are used. Within the GCI, the data from the survey (the primary data or so' data) have an about-70% share, while the secondary ones (the hard data) have a share of about 30%.
The fact that some categories, those considered to be important for the competitive profi le of a country, can only be assessed through a survey, includes a possibility that the rating of sub-indicators may be over-or underestimated. The unrealistic rating of sub-indicators is transferred from the pillars of competitiveness to the fi nal value of the Global Competitiveness Index and a country's ranking.
THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF SERBIA, CROATIA, SLOVENIA AND SLOVAKIA Serbia's position in the WEF competitiveness report is very unfavorable. In the WEF report 2011, Serbia was ranked 95 th on the list of 142 countries, while Croatia was ranked 76 th , Slovenia 57 th and Slovakia 69 th . [2011] [2012] According to the GDP per capita (US$ 5233) and the methodology of the WEF, Serbia is at the middle level of development, i.e. in the second phase of development, in which the key drivers of competitiveness are the pillars of the Effi ciency enhancers group. The low values of the sub-indicators from this group show the real shortcomings of Serbia's competitiveness and consequently its very bad ranking (Table 2) .
While the intensity of the local competition in Serbia is of Rank 136, in Slovenia it is 51, in Croatia 115, and in Slovakia 37. According to the fi rm-level technology absorption, Serbia is 136 th , Slovenia 84th, Croatia 80 th , Table 3 The share of "so' " and "hard" sub-indicators in the structure of GCI (absolutely and in %) [2011] [2012] In the structure of the Effi ciency enhancers, the predominant ones are the "so' " indicators (65%), whose value is determined through the questionnaires. Since this is a subjective rating in the process of an international comparison, the under-or overestimation of the sub-indicators and the impact on the objectivity of the position a country takes are possible.
Pearson's correlation index of the (GCI) and the GDP p/c rank for the observed countries is very high and amounts to 0.986, which is indicative of the fact that there is a very strong positive correlation between the productivity and competitiveness rank. To a certain extent, a small sample of only four countries aff ects the value of Pearson's coeffi cient.
Comparing the "hard" indicators (the government defi cit), the national savings rate in the GDP (%), the infl ation, and the government debt in the GDP (%), we can observe that Serbia is ranked worse than Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia (Table 4) for all the indicators, except for the budget defi cit.
In relation to the observed countries in 2011, Serbia had the highest infl ation (6.2%), the smallest savings rate in the GDP (14.8%) and the largest rate of the government debt in the GDP (44%).
The macroeconomic indicators for the observed countries (Tables from 5. 1 to 5.6), presented in the report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for 2011, show that Serbia had the highest infl ation, with the largest defi cit of the current account balance (9,6 % relative to the GDP), with a low rate of economic growth (1,6%) and a high budget defi cit (4,8% relative to the GDP). There is a consensus reached by economists that the movement of the GDP is a good initial indicator of the successfulness of the countries' economic development. The EBRD report shows that, out of these countries, only Serbia did not reach the pre-transition level of the GDP, while the other countries had a dynamic growth. Croatia's GDP in 2010 is slightly above the level of the GDP in 1989, Slovenia's GDP is 160%, the GDP of Slovakia is 145% and Serbia's GDP is only 70% compared to the level in 1989.
Serbia's balance of trade defi cit represents low economic competitiveness. Tables One of the indicators of Serbia's low competitiveness is its very low export, either viewed in the absolute values or in relation to the population or as the ratio of the exports and the GDP. Based on the data on the GDP and the population from the WEF report for 2011 (8 million people in Serbia, 4.4 million in Croatia, 2.0 million in Slovenia and 5.4 million in Slovakia) and the export value of the analyzed countries, it is concluded that Serbia only had US$ 1752 export per capita, Croatia US$ 5183, Slovenia US$ 14983 and Slovakia US$ 13193. In the year 2010, the coverage of the import by the export was 67.1% for Serbia, 97.1% for Croatia, 97.5% for Slovenia and 96.8% for Slovakia.
PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSITION OF SERBIA'S ECONOMY
Economic experts had predicted, and the twenty-year time period has confi rmed their predictions, that transition is a long and destabilizing process. The radical transformation from the socialist system into the capitalist one included the implementation of the synchronized activities (macroeconomic stabilization, corporatization, privatization, institutional reform, the liberalization of prices and trade and the foreign trade regime), which inevitably caused the transitional stagfl ation (a drop in the economic activity and a high infl ation). In countries that had been consistent in implementing the transition program and had implemented it in the short term, the transitional crisis lasted for a short time (3 to 5 years) and had less severe economic and social consequences. Even ten years a' er the transition, a number of successful transition economies have reached the level of the GDP from 1989, while Serbia has not achieved it in 2012, either. Transition in Serbia had been slow and inconsistent, further hampered by the disintegration of the country, the wars in the region, the UN sanctions, the NATO bombing and the deep-rooted systemic corruption (Maksimović, 2010b) . The ill-conceived privatization process was realized in a disordered institutional environment characterized by the incomplete and confl icting laws and regulations, the underdeveloped and non-transparent procedures. Privatization is not successful if the results of privatization are considered in the light of the proclaimed goals, which are: the increased economic and production effi ciency of companies, providing companies' healthy fi nancing; the introduction of effi cient management; ensuring the infl ow of foreign capital; making space for entrepreneurship; freeing a company from the impact of the state and politics; the increase in the competition; breaking monopolies and limiting their impact; the liquidation of unprofi table companies.
The eff ects of the growth of the privatized companies' economic effi ciency do not signifi cantly infl uence the growth level of the economic activity. , 2012) . The effi ciency of the FDI's in the privatization process was low: out of 222 companies which were off ered for sale by tender in the time period 2002-2010, 108 were sold and 24 contracts were terminated. In the case of the auction privatization, out of 2453 off ered companies, 1645 were sold and nearly one-third of the contracts were terminated (501), (Zec & Radonjić, 2010) . The privatization by tender started from the top companies: these are cement factories, tobacco factories, breweries, pharmaceutical companies, oil companies. By such an off er, the state sought to improve the investment image and a% ract transnational corporations. The smaller companies purchased primarily for the assets and liquidation were sold through auctions. Under the pressure of the entrepreneurial lobbyists, the state sold the companies in auction privatizations at a low starting price, since it valued them as businesses. The buyers were using cheap bank loans to buy the companies with an intention to liquidate them and obtain the property. Entrepreneurship in transition was manifested in the following way: some people became entrepreneurs because they had a possibility of transferring the wealth into their hands through business transactions during hyper-infl ation; others used loans for takeovers, mistakenly believing that they could continue taking loans for capital investments and current assets. It turned out that the new entrepreneurs based the survival of their takeovers on the non-economic and political levers.
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
The quality of macroeconomic stabilization is measured by price stability, a balanced and stable exchange rate of a national currency, the elimination of a state's budget defi cit. The economy's macroeconomic performances indicate that there is a constant infl ationary pressure in the country, because aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply. Due to the delay in the restructuring of the public companies and the monetary expansion, primarily caused by the infl ow of the credit capital, the fi scal expansion further strengthens the infl ationary pressures. Infl ation in Serbia was accompanied by the appreciation of the domestic currency, which resulted in a decline in economic competitiveness and a slower growth. Some economists point out that the range of the restrictive monetary policy in controlling infl ation is very limited and the exchange rate appreciates even in the regime of free fl uctuation, which is explained by the Balassa-Samuelson eff ect (Candelon, 2000; Djuričin, 2006; Dedu, 2010) . Balassa and Samuelson started from the assumption that economy can be divided into two sectors: the tradable goods sector (goods), goods which are the subject of international trade, and nontradable goods sector (services), goods which are not traded on international markets. Productivity grows faster in the tradable goods sector, resulting in the growth of employees' salaries in the sector. Due to the emulation eff ect, there is the growth of salaries in the non-tradable goods sector, which can only be covered by an increase in prices (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2010) . By applying the Balassa-Samuelson eff ect in the case of Serbia, the following conclusion is made: a relatively higher rate of domestic infl ation than the one of foreign infl ation does not entirely aff ect the nominal exchange rate, since the prices of tradable goods (which grow more slowly) are more important for its formation than the prices of non-tradable goods (which grow faster).
As the purchasing power parity does not work in the transition economies, their currencies depreciate by less than the infl ation rate. The result is the appreciation or the slower growth rate of the domestic currency than the infl ation increase is. The real appreciation of the Dinar, thanks to which the prices of the products and services in Serbia expressed in Euros have signifi cantly increased, has resulted in large profi ts in trading. This encourages investments in trade and discourages investments in production.
Serbia is a highly indebted country, which is portrayed in the correlation between the GDP and the external debt. A big problem is the unregulated private debt, which essentially fi nally becomes the public one. This is corroborated by the fact that the loans concluded before December 2000, in the amount of 884.7 million Euros (of which 405.1 million Euros relate to domestic banks and 479.6 million Euros to domestic companies), are excluded from the external debt of the private sector.
The public debt in the GNP is growing as well: it rose from 30.8% in 2007 to 45.1% in 2011 (Survey of Republic of Serbia, 2011).
The distribution of the GDP shows that the Serbian economy spends more than it produces. In 2009, the consolidated government balance showed that the public expenditures exceeded the public revenues by 121.4 billion RSD. In the distribution of the GDP in 2009, consumer spending accounts for 76.5%, and the fi nal consumption of households and the state accounts for 95.9%. In the same year, that ratio in Croatia was 58.2% and 77.4%, in Slovenia 53.7% and 73.3%, and in Slovakia 60.3% and 79.1%, respectively (Zec & Radonjić, 2010) . The imbalance between consumption and production is covered by the imports of consumer products and energy-generating products, not by the import of equipment and machinery. As the expenditure on equipment and machinery is very small, and without investing it is not possible to increase exports, the imbalance of consumption and production is not sustainable in the long-term.
PROBLEMS IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF SERBIA'S ECONOMY
The problems in the restructuring of the economy are associated with the problems in the privatization of the companies (through tenders and auctions), the problems related to the lack of the autonomous development of the small and medium companies and the restructuring of the public sector.
The eff ects of the tender privatization in the commercial sector (the tradable goods sector), whose production is intended for export, are unsatisfactory. In this sector, the tenders were mainly unsuccessful (as in the case of the metal sector), or the buyers were incompetent, without the necessary fi nancial resources and with no clear strategy for the recovery and development of the company.
The sale of the small and medium companies through the auction sale was ineff ective because at least 30% of the contracts were terminated. It turns out that the overriding interest of the customers was not the one of buying a business but the one of buying the buildings and the land of those companies. The outcome of such an entrepreneurship is that the damages and future costs of the state for reconstructing the unsuccessfully privatized companies are larger than the revenues from sales.
The restructuring and privatization of the public companies is a problem that has been lasting for almost two decades. The profi table systems were sold under Source: Survey Republic of Serbia, 2011, 4 such circumstances when social peace needed to be preserved and the budgetary expenditures covered, as was in the case of the sale of Mobtel and Telecom. Financing the expenditure with the privatization revenues and a loss of future profi ts (which can be reinvested elsewhere in the world) severely reduce the potential for economic recovery. Many economists point out that the restructuring of the public sector can be found a solution to either through privatization or through bankruptcy and liquidation.
The experience of the Western countries in the privatization of the public sector in the 1980's demonstrated that all public companies operating in competitive industries should be privatized, and that it is be% er to keep natural monopolies in the state's ownership. It turned out that the availability of information from public companies and their control by the state as well as the possibility of applying a large number of industrial policy instruments provide greater benefi ts than shi' ing to the capital market control. In other words, in the case of natural monopolies, the effi ciency of regulation rather than ownership is a more signifi cant factor for effi cient operations, assuming that the de-politicization of regulatory agencies is performed.
CONCLUSION
Raising national competitiveness has become the most important task of the government of every country. Despite numerous debates on national competitiveness, there is no comprehensive theory to encompass all the aspects of the competitiveness of a country. In an eff ort to evaluate the economic and business potential of the world economies, the WEF researchers have developed the concept of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), linking the micro-and macroeconomic indicators of competitiveness.
The hypothesis that the macroeconomic performances of the national economies are positively correlated with their global competitiveness index is confi rmed in the paper in the case of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia.
The paper confi rmed the hypothesis that the poor macroeconomic performances of Serbia's economy and the bad ranking according to the GCI are caused by the systemic limitations in its economy.
The systemic limitations in the Serbian economy are primarily the result of the transition concept and its realization, the concept of macroeconomic stabilization, the concept of institutional reforms, and the restructuring of the economy. The poorly conceived, poorly institutionally arranged and slow process of privatization has destroyed a signifi cant degree of production resources. The deindustrialization of the economy resulted in a decline in competitiveness and the growth of the trade defi cit. The institutional reform was ineffi cient and failed to implement institutions corresponding to the contemporary development of society, technique and technology. In an economy where there is no productivity growth and no profi table production valorized in the world market, macroeconomic stability cannot be achieved in the long term by restrictive monetary and credit policies, which has a number of limitations. The abovementioned systemic limitations reduce the ability of an economy to produce and compete effi ciently in the world market.
The ultimate goal of raising the competitiveness of an economy, i.e. raising the standard of living, cannot be achieved without a new development strategy and the elimination of systemic limitations. This means the correction of the economic policy, the strengthening of the market institutions and the rule of the law institutions, the completion of the privatization process (which includes company liquidation) as well as the restructuring of public companies based on the model of the Western countries.
